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ABSTRACT
As firms have more assets in place, more of management’s limited attention is focused on managing
assets in place rather than developing new growth options. Consequently, as firms grow older, they
have fewer growth options and a lower ability to generate new growth options. This simple theory
predicts that Tobin’s q falls with age. Further, competition in the product market is expected to slow
down the decrease in Tobin’s q because it forces firms to look for alternative sources of rents. Similarly,
greater competition in the labor market reduces the decrease in Tobin’s q with age because old firms
are in a better position to hire employees that can help with innovation. In contrast, competition in
the market for corporate control should accelerate the decline because it forces management to focus
more on managing assets in place whose performance is more directly observable than on developing
growth options where results may not be observable for some time. We find strong support for these
predictions in tests using exogenous variation in competition.
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Why is it that older firms are worth less? Existing theories emphasize the fact that firms use up 
their growth opportunities and that their prospects become less uncertain (Pastor and Veronesi (2003)). 
However, these theories do not explain why firms cannot keep acquiring new growth opportunities and 
renew themselves. They also apply most forcefully to firms that went recently public. Yet, as we 
show, firm valuations measured by Tobin’s q (estimated as the ratio of the market value of the firm’s 
assets divided by their book value) fall by roughly 1% per year for firms that are older than five years 
since the IPO. In this paper, we develop and test a simple theory that explains why firms become less 
good at creating growth opportunities as they age and, therefore, helps us to better understand the 
effect of age on firm investment policies and valuation.  
With our theory, management cannot devote as much attention to developing growth opportunities 
as the firm ages. Management has a finite amount of time to devote to managing a firm. At the top of 
the firm, the CEO’s time is a binding constraint on his ability to pay attention and to manage different 
areas within the firm he leads. Before a firm goes public, management dedicates much of its time to 
developing growth options as the firm has few assets in place, and its ability to go public will 
generally depend on its prospects rather than on its assets in place. Firms go public to monetize these 
growth options and to raise funds to exercise them. Once a firm becomes public, management 
optimally spends more time managing its assets in place as the firm exercises its growth options and 
has to meet investors’ expectations. The greater focus on assets in place means that less attention is 
devoted to developing new growth options. Therefore, as a firm ages, it has fewer growth options and 
becomes poorer at developing such options.  
Any theory of Tobin’s q that endows the firm with growth options that it exercises optimally over 
time concludes that Tobin’s q falls as these growth options are exercised. However, such a theory 
cannot explain why firms do not replace these growth options. As assets in place increase, the firm has 
to develop more valuable growth options just to stay in place in terms of its Tobin’s q. Hence, for the 
firm to keep developing growth options that allow its Tobin’s q to stay constant, the CEO would have 
to give more attention to growth options, which is not possible as assets in place increasingly require 
her attention. As a result, a firm is very unlikely to ever replace the growth options that it had in its 
youth. We find strong support for this prediction. More specifically, adjusting q for calendar-year and 
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industry effects, only 30% of the sample firms ever exceed the maximum q they reach during the first 
four years after listing.  These findings could, in principle, reflect an IPO effect.  Jain and Kini (1994), 
for example, find that operating performance deteriorates after the IPO.  Moreover, Loughran and 
Ritter (1995), among others, document that the stock of newly listed firms underperforms significantly 
in the years after the IPO (see, however, Fama (1998)).  Yet the same results obtain when we exclude 
firms younger than 10 years, and when we measure age relative to the date of incorporation rather than 
to that of listing.  Hence, the evidence is distinct from a pure IPO effect.     
Competition in the market for corporate control means that management has to focus on managing 
well assets in place since poor performance of assets in place is readily observable while the 
performance of management in generating growth opportunities that have yet to manifest themselves 
is much harder to assess. Therefore, we would expect firms to age more quickly, i.e., to have fewer 
growth options, and hence a lower Tobin’s q, if there is more competition in the market for corporate 
control. This prediction can be tested using exogenous changes in the degree of competition in the 
market for corporate control. Using the state adoption of business combination laws that restrict 
competition in the market for corporate control, we show in a difference-in-differences setting that 
Tobin’s q falls more slowly with age for firms incorporated in states where such laws are put in place. 
Product market competition lowers the value of the firm’s assets in place. Escaping competition 
and regaining rents is a major motivation for firms to focus on innovation. This “escape competition” 
motive for innovation has been formalized in Aghion, Harris, Howitt, and Vickers’ (2001) endogenous 
growth model, among others. It is also consistent with recent studies that find that competition spurs 
growth (Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2013); Fogel, Morck, and Yeung (2008)) and innovation 
(Bernstein (2012)). If product market competition makes the assets in place less valuable, we would 
expect the CEO to spend more time on creating new growth opportunities for the firm’s core 
competences and less time on managing assets in place. Therefore, older firms in a competitive 
industry should be relatively better at creating new growth opportunities than their peers in non-
competitive industries. To test this prediction, we use the industry concentration index suggested by 
Hoberg and Phillips (2011) to identify firms that operate in a more competitive environment. 
Consistent with our prediction, we find that the age effect is lower for firms in competitive industries. 
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The result is not driven by the fact that firms in non-competitive industries start with higher q ratios 
and therefore experience a sharper decline over time.  
One possible concern with this result is that the degree of competition could be endogenously 
determined. Firms with abnormally high q ratios tend to attract competitors, particularly in industries 
with low barriers to entry. This could reduce q ratios over time as well. To address this endogeneity 
issue, we look at industries that experienced exogenous competitive shocks, namely large reductions in 
import tariffs, during the sample period. Lower tariffs should intensify product market competition. 
The data are from Frésard and Valta (2012). Tariff reductions should be exogenous to corporate 
policies (see also Guadalupe and Wulf (2010)). Consistent with the notion that firms age less quickly 
in a competitive environment, the age effect shrinks significantly after tariff reductions. 
Exogenous variation in labor markets provides another way to test the implications of our theory. 
Young firms are firms with growth options. They face the risk that employees will defect and take 
knowledge with them that is relevant to these growth options. In contrast, old firms that have focused 
on assets in place will lack employees that could help them innovate. We would therefore expect laws 
that restrict employee mobility to be valuable for young firms but hurt old firms. Hence, we would 
expect firms to age more quickly in states where non-competition agreements are more strongly 
enforced. We find that this is the case.  
It is much easier to evaluate whether management is doing well at managing assets in place than at 
developing new growth options. Firms disclose data that enable investors to compute a wide range of 
metrics to assess management’s performance at managing assets in place. Most simply, investors can 
estimate the profitability of these assets. Management’s efforts at developing new growth options 
typically involve R&D investments, which are notoriously difficult to evaluate from outside the firm 
(Edmans, Heinle, and Huang (2013)). Further, it is often the case that management cannot disclose the 
progress made through these investments because doing so it would provide valuable proprietary 
information to competitors (Verrecchia (1983)). Financial analysts, shareholders, and media 
monitoring the firm will find it more difficult to assess management’s performance in generating 
growth options than in assessing its performance managing assets in place. Hence, outside monitoring 
will focus management’s attention more on assets in place than on generating growth options (see also 
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Edmans, Heinle, and Huang (2013)). Management will also be more focused on preventing bad 
surprises from assets in place, which will lead it to develop mechanisms within the firm that control 
the performance of assets in place more tightly. In particular, rules are adopted to economize on 
managerial attention. While such mechanisms are helpful for the performance of assets in place, they 
make innovation within the firm more difficult as they reduce the discretion of employees within the 
firm.  
Our arguments are related to those advanced by Holmstrom (1989). When firms go public to fund 
the exercise of growth options, they become larger, more complex organizations. In larger firms, 
according to Holmstrom, it is difficult to provide incentives for such different activities as 
production/marketing and innovation. To reap the financial rewards from their growth opportunities, 
listed firms therefore rationally rely more on rigid rules as a substitute for incentives. This 
compromises the willingness to experiment and innovate, and screens out innovative personalities. In 
addition, listed firms are more dependent on the capital markets and are therefore more concerned 
about their reputation. Concern about funding, according to Holmstrom, has a tendency to make larger 
firms myopic in their behavior and therefore less concerned about innovation. If they do invest, one 
could argue, insiders have an incentive to pursue incremental innovation projects because they have a 
higher probability of early success and are more easily understood by investors (Ferreira, Manso, and 
Silva (2012)). Incremental projects are tied to the lifecycle of the firm’s products and therefore 
represent sources of growth opportunities that are limited in time. 
At older firms, assets in place receive more attention than at younger firms. We therefore expect 
assets in place to be well-managed at such firms. The older firm becomes much more focused on being 
the best at what it does instead of being focused on developing new activities. However, this focus 
means that the firm will be less likely to innovate successfully. As its ability to innovate falls, it 
becomes less advantageous for the firm to try to innovate. Hence, we expect older firms to invest less 
in R&D and to become less likely to try to develop new businesses. These older firms will 
increasingly pay out their excess cash flows because they lack positive net present value projects. Our 
evidence supports these predictions. We find that the firms that become older do not become less 
efficient or more poorly managed. However, they spend less on R&D, invest less in capital 
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expenditures, and pay out more. Well-known specific older firms in our sample seem to be firms that 
fit our theory. For instance, in 2009, these firms include Alcoa, Coca Cola, Dow Chemical, General 
Dynamics, Hershey, McDonald’s, Pepsi, and Procter & Gamble. These firms are older and focused, 
and have comparatively lower growth opportunities.  
There are several potential alternative explanations for the fact that old firms have lower Tobin’s q 
ratios. The first one is that young firms are credit constrained. For a credit constrained firm, marginal q 
will be high. As the firm becomes less credit constrained, its marginal q falls. If marginal q is a 
declining function of the level of total past capital expenditures, we expect average q to exceed 
marginal q and to also decline. Hence, old firms that are not constrained will have a lower Tobin’s q. 
To minimize the importance of this problem, most of our empirical work considers only firms that are 
at least five-years old. More importantly, we show that credit constraints cannot explain why firms that 
pay out cash to their shareholders (dividends or share buybacks) experience the same decline in 
Tobin’s q ratios over time as other firms.  
Another possible explanation is provided by agency theory. In a narrow sense, the explanation is 
that management is more likely to be entrenched in older firms so that for the same assets shareholders 
expect lower cash flows for older firms than for newer firms. With this explanation, management 
consumes more private benefits in older firms. Even though executive stock ownership is lower in 
older firms, and boards are larger, we find little evidence to support this implication. Management 
does not have more abnormal compensation in older firms. Further, older firms have greater payouts 
on average. Finally, the agency explanation of the decline in Tobin’s q ratios over time cannot explain 
why firms that face less competition in the market for corporate control see their q ratios fall less 
quickly.  
A broader version of the agency explanation is that entrenchment grows at many levels of the 
corporation and is not attached to individuals but to business units of the corporation. With this view, 
business units protect their turf, so that they prevent units with valuable growth opportunities from 
taking advantage of them (e.g., Scharfstein and Stein (2000); Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000)). In 
other words, internal capital markets become less efficient as firms become older. This broader agency 
theory is not completely distinct from our theory of managerial attention. As the firm becomes more 
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established, managers have to cater more to established units within the firm. However, this theory is 
hard to reconcile with our evidence that firms do not generally become less efficient in their core 
activities. Rather, this theory explains more why firms fail in renewing themselves through 
acquisitions because existing units may make it difficult to integrate the acquired unit.  
Lastly, one might argue that lifecycle theories of the firm make predictions similar to some of 
those we test (Fama and French (2001); Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002); DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006)). In particular, these theories also predict that older firms pay out more. 
However, the critical difference between our paper and papers inspired by these theories is that we 
develop a specific mechanism that leads older firms to differ from young ones and test this specific 
mechanism. The key tests of our mechanism exploit exogenous variation in competition. These tests 
have no counterpart in the literature inspired by lifecycle theories.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In the first section, we expand the presentation of our theory and 
derive more precisely its testable hypotheses. In Section II, we discuss the data. In Section III, we 
show that Tobin’s q falls with age across industries, and firms are unlikely to ever again achieve the 
Tobin’s q of their youth. We investigate the role of competition in the decrease in Tobin’s q in Section 
IV. In Section V, we show that old firms are more efficient, invest less, pay out more, and are more 
focused. In Section VI, we investigate whether the predictions of alternative theories of aging are 
supported by the evidence. We conclude in Section VII.  
 
I. Theoretical considerations  
In this section, we present in greater detail our theory of managerial attention and show how it 
leads to the hypotheses we test in the paper. We take the view that the essence of the CEO’s job is to 
make choices for the firm. If he makes the right choices, the firm is more likely to do well. Otherwise, 
it is more likely to struggle. 
To make our ideas more concrete, we consider the simple case of a CEO who has to allocate his 
time between two activities. Once he has allocated his time, these activities generate a payoff. The 
payoff of an activity is positive if the CEO makes the right decisions in that activity and zero 
otherwise. To make decisions, the CEO has to become informed about their consequences. The more 
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time he allocates to an activity, the more likely she is to make the right decisions. The CEO lives for 
only one period. Compensation contracts that make the CEO’s compensation dependent on future 
periods are assumed not to be possible.  
The activities are a and b. If she makes the right choices, the firm has a payoff of A with activity a 
and of B with activity b. If the CEO makes the wrong choices in an activity, the payoff of the activity 
is zero. There is no way for the CEO to know for sure whether she is making the right decisions, but 
the probability of making the right decisions in an activity is an increasing concave function of the 
time spent on the activity. Consequently, if the time spent is e, the probability of making the right 
decisions in activity a is p(e), with p'(e) > 0 and p''(e) < 0. The probability of making the right 
decisions with activity b is q(e). This probability is also an increasing concave function of the time 
allocated to that activity. We assume that the CEO allocates all her time, so that our model is not a 
model about how hard the CEO works. The CEO has total time of L, so that she allocates L – e to 
activity b. The time allocation of the CEO is not observable, so that pay cannot be a function of e.  
We assume that the CEO is risk neutral and that his utility is equal to her expected income. For 
simplicity, we assume that the CEO’s compensation is simply a fraction s of the firm’s payoff. With 
these assumptions, the expected utility of the CEO is:  
U = s*[p(e)*A + q(L – e)*B] 
Solving for the CEO’s allocation of her time, the first-order condition of time allocation is: 
p’(e)*A – q’(L–e)*B = 0 
This optimality condition can be represented in the following figure. The vertical axis of the figure is 
the marginal utility of the CEO’s effort. The intersection of the marginal utility schedules from 
investing time in activity A and B yields the optimal allocation of time e* and (L – e*), respectively. 
If the two activities are symmetric, the CEO splits her time in half between the two activities. 
Everything else equal, the amount of time spent on an activity increases with the payoff of the activity. 
Moreover, if the CEO’s time becomes more productive in an activity, say b, in that spending more 
time in b increases the probability of a payoff more than if she spends that time in activity a, the CEO 
allocates more time to activity b.  
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Suppose now that activity a is working on growth options and activity b is working on assets in 
place. Growth options are operations that require new future investments. Their value is not reflected 
in the value of assets in place. If the firm goes public to finance the exercise of its growth options, we 
expect A to decline and B to increase. Hence, as the firm goes public, the CEO of the public firm 
spends more time on activity B than the CEO of the private firm. However, this means that the firm 
will dedicate less time to developing growth opportunities than it did when it was private. Note that 
this impact of listing is not driven by the disclosure requirements and the increased investment 
relations activities of public firms, nor is it caused by increased size per se. What causes the change in 
CEO attention is the higher marginal benefit from the time dedicated to assets in place. This effect is 
conceivably compounded by incentives for short-termist behavior brought about by a capital market 
that reacts quickly to good news (Ferreira, Manso, and Silva (2012)) and by evidence of managerial 
myopia (Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2013)).  
As the CEO devotes less attention to developing growth opportunities, the firm will become less 
successful at developing such growth opportunities, particularly in areas outside its core, and 
employees focused on such activities will have less status in the firm. This endogenous “rigidity” is 
compounded by a series of organizational measures, rules of conduct, and best practice the CEO 
implements to take full advantage of assets in place. This evolution will also make the firm a less 
attractive place of employment for individuals who work on developing growth opportunities, which 
will decrease the payoff, A, of activity a. As A falls, the CEO spends even less time on activity a.  
  9 
With this simple model, the firm becomes less successful at developing growth opportunities after 
it becomes public. Growth opportunities become a smaller part of its valuation and its Tobin’s q falls. 
Over time, as the payoffs of growth options fall, the firm will increasingly attract CEOs who are good 
at managing assets in place rather than creating growth options. It follows that the firm will become 
increasingly efficient in its management of assets in place but innovation will play less of a role for the 
firm both because it will be optimal for its CEO to focus more assets in place and because it will not 
attract CEOs focused on innovation. 
A number of factors can accelerate or slow down the phenomenon we describe. To start with, 
consider the impact of competition in the market for the goods the firm produces. With greater 
competition, the value of B falls. In reaction, the CEO will optimally reallocate her attention and 
dedicate more time to the development of growth opportunities. It follows that an increase in the 
competition in the market for the goods the firm produces will slow down the decrease of Tobin’s q 
with age as the firm will develop more growth opportunities.  
Competition in the market for corporate control can also affect how the CEO allocates her 
attention. Increased competition would seem to force the CEO to allocate her time to activities that 
make a successful takeover less likely. Poor performance with assets in place is much easier to assess 
than poor performance in generating growth opportunities. It is widely accepted that growth options 
involve greater information asymmetries than assets in place. Further, there are costs for the firm to 
disclose the current state of its efforts at generating growth opportunities. For instance, through early 
disclosure, it might make it easier for other firms to imitate its efforts. Hence, it will be much easier 
for the CEO to demonstrate ability by showing good performance for assets in place than through 
efforts to create growth opportunities. Pressure from the market for corporate control will therefore 
make it optimal for the CEO to devote more attention to assets in place than to creating growth 
opportunities. Hence, such pressure will accelerate the decrease of Tobin’s q as the firm ages.  
Yet another factor that should affect the allocation of the CEO’s time is labor market competition. 
Young firms have the employees that enabled them to acquire growth opportunities that justified going 
public. Over time, however, these employees will leave or will become less productive. If the firm is 
limited in its ability to hire employees that generate growth opportunities but not employees that 
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exploit assets in place, the CEO will have fewer incentives to devote attention to that activity, so that a 
firm will see its innovative activities fall more as it ages. Laws that limit labor market competition will 
make it harder to hire employees with the potential to have a large impact on a firm’s growth 
opportunities because the current employer of such employees will better be able to prevent them from 
working for another firm. It seems reasonable to assume that employees that help the CEO exploit 
assets in place will generally be easier to hire than employees who generate growth opportunities. 
Hence, one would expect restrictions on labor market competition to accelerate the fall of Tobin’s q as 
the firm ages.  
 
II. Data 
A. Sample Description  
The sample consists of all listed firms with data on CRSP, COMPUSTAT, and COMPUSTAT 
Industry Segment between 1978 and 2009. We exclude utilities as well as firms with business 
segments in the financial sector (SIC 6000–6999). Similarly, we ignore firms with: (a) negative total 
assets or sales; (b) missing data to compute the market capitalization of equity, or with negative 
capitalization; (c) missing data on COMPUSTAT Segments; (d) cumulative sales on the 
COMPUSTAT Segment tapes which deviate by more than 1% from the total sales reported on the 
COMPUSTAT tapes. Since very young firms might drive the results (Fama and French (2004)), we 
generally omit all firms under five. This omission, however, does not change our conclusions. The 
final sample consists of 10,219 firms and 83,790 firm-years. 
We start with 2,324 firms in 1978 and end with 1,738 firms in 2009. Turnover is remarkably high: 
7,934 firms enter and 6,438 firms leave between 1978 and 2009. Some of the firms that drop from the 
exchanges in going-private transactions may list again years later, for example in a reverse LBO. Cao 
and Lerner (2009) identify 526 such transactions between 1981 and 2003. Firms that relist are 
typically treated as separate firms in the literature, but this practice could bias our results. We use 
Compustat’s unique identifier (gvkey) to track companies over time in spite of name or ticker changes.  
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B. Firm Age 
We follow Fama and French (2001) and Pastor and Veronesi (2003) and assume that firms are 
“born” in the year of their first appearance on the CRSP tapes. Consequently, firm age is the number 
of years (plus one) elapsed since the year of the company’s IPO.1 Most studies that look at firm age 
use the same definition. We refer to this variable as the firm’s listing age. Shumway (2001) argues that 
listing age is the economically most meaningful measure of firm age, since listing is a defining 
moment in a company’s life – it affects ownership and capital structure, multiplies growth 
opportunities, increases media exposure, and demands different corporate governance structures 
(Loderer and Waelchli (2010)). Since CRSP goes back to 1925, the oldest a firm can be at the 
beginning of our sample period in 1976 is 51 years, compared with 84 years at its end, in 2009. 
Alternatively, we also compute the number of years (plus one) elapsed since the year of incorporation 
and denote this variable as the firm’s incorporation age. The information is hand-collected from 
Mergent Webreports as well as from Jay Ritter’s website.   Throughout the investigation, Age refers to 
a company’s listing age and Ageinc indicates the firm’s incorporation age. 
On average, listing age is 17 years; the median is 13 (Table I). The distribution of firm age 
remains fairly stable over the sample period. Incorporation age has an average value of 34 and a 
median value of 25. 
 
C. Profitability Measures and Control Variables  
Table I reports descriptive statistics for all the variables in the analysis. To reduce the influence of 
outliers, we winsorize all variables at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled distribution. The 
results, however, do not depend on this winsorization. Ownership structure and corporate-governance 
data are available for only a limited subsample of firms. All definitions are in the Appendix. To assess 
financial constraints (KZ index), we follow Lamont, Polk, and Saá-Requejo (2001), among others, and 
estimate the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index. The results do not change when we replace that index 
                                                     
1  More precisely, we approximate a firm’s year of birth with the earliest of: (a) the year in which the firm 
appears on CRSP; (b) the year in which the firm is included in COMPUSTAT; and (c) the year for which 
we find a link between CRSP and COMPUSTAT (based on COMPUSTAT data item LINKDT). If, for 
example, a firm enters CRSP or COMPUSTAT in 1996, its age is one year at the end of 1996 (1+1996-
1996) and five years at the end of 2000 (1+2000-1996). 
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with alternative measures, such as a binary variable that identifies dividend payers. Except for the 
correlation between listing and incorporation age, which equals 0.56, most pairwise correlation 
coefficients between regressors are fairly low (not tabulated), so that there is no concern about 
collinearity.  
 
III. Firm Age and Growth Opportunities 
The managerial attention hypothesis predicts that, since managers of listed firms have to dedicate 
a significant amount of their time to current operations and assets in place to generate the earnings that 
investors expect, their ability to innovate and create new growth opportunities is limited. Since, at the 
same time, the growth opportunities available at the time of listing will be used up over time, the stock 
of growth opportunities is expected to decrease as the firm ages. We test this prediction in this section. 
Pastor and Veronesi (2003) show that the market-to-book ratio of a firm falls with age and falls more 
rapidly early on. Our theory applies more directly to Tobin’s q and we are more concerned about firms 
that have been public for a number of years. Our sample is larger than theirs because we do not have to 
require a positive book value of equity as they do.  
 
A. Decline in Tobin’s q Ratios over Time  
Figure 1 shows the relation between the Tobin’s q ratio and company age implied by estimating 
local polynomial regressions of the Tobin’s q ratio on firm age using an Epanechnikov kernel function 
with a “rule-of-thumb” bandwidth estimator and local-mean smoothing. The advantage of this 
approach is that we do not impose a functional form for how Tobin’s q changes with a firm’s age.  
Figures (a) and (b) show the unconditional relation. Consistent with the hypothesis, the relation is 
negative regardless of whether we measure company age from the date of listing or from that of 
incorporation. We explore next whether the relation between Tobin’s q and age holds if we control for 
firm characteristics. We first estimate an OLS regression with industry-year fixed-effects of Tobin’s q 
on Capex, R&D, Focus, KZ-index, Leverage, Size, Volatility, and ROA. We define industries at the 
three-digit SIC level. Then, we regress these residuals on incorporation age and listing age, 
respectively. The resulting conditional relation between company age and Tobin’s q is negative as 
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well, no matter how we measure company age. Figures (c) and (d) show results when we control for 
firm characteristics.  
For a formal test of the relation between age and Tobin’s q, we estimate OLS panel regressions 
with industry-year fixed-effects and firm-clustered standard errors.2 This approach enables us to 
distinguish between cohort and age effects, even though the results are qualitatively the same when we 
run separate cross-sectional regressions for each year as in Pastor and Veronesi (2003) (not 
tabulated).3  
The results are reported in Panel A of Table II. Regressions 1 and 2 relate to the full sample. 
Consistent with the hypothesis, the coefficient of the natural logarithm of listing age is negative and 
significant. So is the coefficient of the binary variable Old dummy, which identifies firms older than 
the sample median in any given year. The same results obtain when we ignore firms younger than 5 
years (regressions 3 and 4). Since young firms dominate the full sample, the following analysis omits, 
as we already mentioned, firms younger than 5 years in terms of listing age—the exceptions will be 
mentioned explicitly.  
Note that, since we are controlling for firm size, our findings do not reflect declining returns to 
scale. Older firms do not have lower q ratios because they are larger. The age coefficient remains 
negative and significant, and essentially unchanged, when we estimate separate regressions for large 
and small firms (not tabulated).4  
If listing demands increased attention to assets in place over time, the age effect we document 
should be distinct from a possible age effect the company might have experienced before listing. To 
test this proposition, we extend regression 3 with a variable that measures incorporation age at the time 
of listing (ln(Ageinc at listing)). Previous work shows that incorporation age at listing varies 
substantially over time (Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001); Fink et al. (2010)). Regression 5 shows the 
                                                     
2  We do not add firm fixed-effects to our standard regression because Age would be collinear with year 
fixed effects (Age grows by 1 each year). In untabulated robustness tests, we replace Age with Old 
dummy. In that regression, the coefficient of Old dummy remains negative and significant if we include 
firm fixed-effects. 
3  As a further control for cohort effects, we tried excluding all firms born before the start of the sample 
period in 1978. That exclusion does not affect the results either (not tabulated). 
4  In untabulated regressions, we also used alternative measures of size, including sales and the number of 
employees, as well as different functional forms for the relation between size and Tobin’s q. These 
choices do not affect the age effect we find. 
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results. ln(Ageinc at listing) is negative and significant, indicating that firms that list at a later stage of 
their life cycle have fewer growth opportunities. More importantly, however, ln(Age) maintains its 
negative and significant coefficient. We conclude that, consistent with our attention hypothesis, the 
listing age effect is a phenomenon which differs from or is incremental to that associated with the 
firm’s age prior to listing. 
The coefficients of the control variables are mostly in line with the extant literature across 
regression specifications. Capital expenditures, R&D outlays, focus, and volatility are associated with 
larger Tobin’s q ratios (the latter result is consistent, in particular, with Pastor and Veronesi (2003)). 
Firm size, however, has a positive coefficient and financial frictions, as measured with the KZ-Index, 
seem to be immaterial. We also find that ROA has a negative coefficient, possibly because a high 
ROA increases the opportunity costs of looking for growth opportunities. Financial leverage has a 
negative coefficient.  
Panel B uses the estimates of the regressions 1 (full sample) and 3 (subsample of firms older than 
4) to assess the economic significance of the relation between age on Tobin’s q. Firms in the 25th 
percentile of the full sample of listing age (year 4), for example, are predicted to have a q of 2.07, 
compared with 1.82 if they are in the 75th percentile (year 17). Hence, a time lapse of 13 years brings 
about a decline of 12 percent, or a steady annual decrease of almost 1 percent. Note that, if age is a 
noisy measure of the limited managerial attention problem, these estimates will be affected by 
attenuation bias. 
 
B. Decline in Tobin’s q Ratios across Industries  
It is well-known that there is an industry lifecycle (Bernstein (2012)). A concern with our results is 
that they might just reflect that lifecycle. A simple approach to separate the industry lifecycle from the 
firm lifecycle is to estimate our regressions within industries. We use the 48 industries identified by 
Fama and French (2001) to perform this analysis. We estimate separate regressions for each of the 48 
industries for which there is a sufficient number of observations (Table III). The regression 
specification is the same as that in column 3 of Table II, except that, since we work with industry-
specific subsamples, the only fixed effects we include are year-fixed effects. Standard errors are 
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clustered at the firm level. For simplicity, we report only the coefficient of ln(Age). We use that 
coefficient to compute the impact on Tobin’s q of a change in listing age from the 25th to the 75th 
percentile of the pooled distribution of age in the industry. This effect is measured relative to the 
average q in the industry, and is shown for statistically significant age coefficients.  
The relation between age and Tobin’s q is negative and significant at least at the 5% level for 24 
out of the 38 industries we report, and it is negative and significant at the 1% level in 22 out of these 
38 cases. The marginal impact of age is similar across industries, and it goes from about 5% (Office 
Supplies) to 17% (Printing and Publishing). We obtain very similar results when measuring age since 
incorporation. Only two industries have a positive and significant coefficient: Candy and Soda, and 
Textiles. Note, however, that there are only 44 candy and soda producers and 77 textile companies in 
the sample.  
 
C. Inability to Revert to the Initial Success 
The puzzling aspect of the relation between age and Tobin’s q is the fact that firms are unable to 
renew their success, in spite of the fact that they can learn and that they can buy into new technologies 
and markets. Table IV documents this phenomenon from a slightly different perspective. Panel A 
performs an unconditional analysis of the 8,079 firms with the necessary number of observations by 
comparing the maximum Tobin’s q ratios observed during the first four years after listing (denoted 
with q*) with the maximum ratios observed thereafter. Consistent with the inability to renew growth 
opportunities, these maximum ratios average 3.6 in younger firms compared with 3.0 in older firms. 
The corresponding median values are 2.3 and 2.1, respectively. Both differences are statistically 
significant with confidence at the 99% confidence level.  
Following a similar logic, Figure 2 asks how likely it is that a firm will be able to exceed q* as a 
function of age. To filter out common effects, we measure q as the residual from a pooled OLS 
regression of Tobin’s q on industry and year fixed-effects. The figure shows that very few firms 
manage to exceed their q* after year four. At age 5, for example, only 12.2% of the sample firms have 
a q larger than q*. This fraction more or less gradually declines to 8.3% at age 25. Moreover, we find 
that only 30% of the firms ever beat their q* (not tabulated).  
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Panel B of Table IV conducts an analysis of the ability to exceed q* with conditional logit 
regressions and industry-year fixed-effects and robust standard errors. The binary dependent variable 
equals 1 if the Tobin’s q of the firm in question increases beyond q* in any given year, and it equals 0 
otherwise. We test whether the probability of that event, among firms that are below the maximum, 
declines with age. The evidence is consistent with this prediction. The coefficient of our two measures 
of age, ln(Age) and Old dummy, is negative and significant. Interestingly, there is no evidence that 
research and development activities are able to slow down the decay in growth opportunities. The 
coefficient of an interaction term between Old dummy and R&D is statistically zero. 
These findings could be affected by survivorship bias, although that would induce a gentler 
decline in average q ratios and therefore go against our hypothesis.  Most firms disappear because of 
takeover (Baker and Kennedy (2002)), and firms with high growth opportunities are less likely to be 
taken over (Loderer and Waelchli (2013)).  Hence, the best firms tend to remain, which should raise 
the observed Tobin’s q ratios above the level we would measure without the exclusion of the firms that 
merged or were taken over.   
 
IV. Managerial Attention, Competition, and the Corporate Aging 
The limited managerial attention hypothesis predicts that the relation between age and Tobin’s q 
should be more negative when competition forces management to devote more attention to assets in 
place and flatter when it makes it more advantageous for management to devote more attention to 
generating growth opportunities. In particular, as discussed in Section II, greater competition in the 
goods market increases the value to management from paying more attention to generating growth 
opportunities, so that it makes the relation between age and Tobin’s q flatter. Similarly, management 
has to pay more attention to assets in place when there is more competition in the market for corporate 
control, so that the slope of the relation between Tobin’s q and age is more negative. Finally, if the 
firm can more easily hire people who can generate growth opportunities, the expected gain to 
management from paying attention to generating growth opportunities is higher, so that the relation 
between age and Tobin’s q is less negative. We test these predictions in this section.  
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A. Product Market Competition 
Table V reports tests of the hypothesis that the relation between age and Tobin’s q is less negative 
when product market competition is more intense.  
We first measure competition with the firm-specific concentration index suggested by Hoberg and 
Phillips (2011). The data cover the years 1996 to 2008. During that period, we find matching 
information for 33,891 firm-years. We identify firms in a competitive environment if their 
concentration index is below the sample median concentration index in any given year (High 
competition dummy). In regression 1 of Table V, we add High competition dummy (lagged by 1 year) 
and an interaction term with ln(Age) to our standard regression. The evidence shows that the 
coefficient of age is still negative and significant. Consistent with the managerial attention hypothesis, 
the interaction term is positive and significant, indicating that Tobin’s q falls more slowly with age in 
a more competitive environment.  
The problem is that Tobin’s q is higher for firms with more monopolistic rents (Salinger (1984)). 
If so, if we assume that Tobin’s q ratios eventually converge towards one, the decline in Tobin’s q 
could be more moderate in competitive environments simply because competitive environments have 
lower q ratios to begin with. Consistent with this argument, the coefficient of High competition dummy 
is negative and significant. To address this issue, we re-estimate the regressions with standardized 
Tobin’s q as the dependent variable so that Tobin’s q is adjusted for rents earned by firms in the 
subsample. Standardization means that we demean the q of a given firm by the q observed for its 
subsample of firms (grouped into high vs. low competition in any given year) and divide by the 
subsample standard deviation of q. We include the subsample’s average q as an additional control 
variable. The results, however, do not change (regression 2).  
An alternative approach to control for endogeneity is to look for exogenous competitive shocks. 
Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) and Frésard and Valta (2012), among others, argue that import tariff 
changes constitute shocks in product market competition. Tariff reductions, in particular, should 
increase competition. We can therefore use exogenous reductions in tariffs to test for whether the 
relation between a firm’s Tobin’s q and its age depends on competition. We use the industry-specific 
import tariff reductions identified by Frésard and Valta (2012). For the affected industries (at the SIC 
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4-digit level), we define a binary variable, Lower tariff dummy, that identifies industry-years after the 
tariff reduction. We add this variable to the standard regression and interact it with firm age. The 
results are shown in regression 3 of Table V. While stronger competition reduces the industry’s overall 
level of growth opportunities, it slows down the age-related decay in Tobin’s q. The same results 
obtain when we use standardized q ratios (grouped into pre vs. post tariff reduction cohorts in any 
given calendar year) as the dependent variable (regression 4). The same result also obtains when we 
use the binary measure of age, Old dummy, instead of ln(Age) in regression 4 (not tabulated).  
 
B. Competition in the Market for Corporate Control 
As discussed in Section 2, we expect the relation between Tobin’s q and age to be more negative if 
competition in the market for corporate control is stronger. We test this prediction using the 
introduction of business combination laws as a source of exogenous variation in external corporate 
control regimes.  
Business combination laws deter corporate control transactions by imposing a moratorium on 
transactions, such as mergers, between a large shareholder and the firm incorporated in a particular 
state as soon as the shareholder’s stake exceeds a given size. Delaware, for example, enacted these 
statutes during the 1980s to deter hostile leveraged corporate takeovers. These laws take some of the 
pressure off management to make an efficient use of their assets to avoid a takeover (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2003)). Under these laws, we would therefore expect management to be able to dedicate 
more time to generate growth opportunities, which would imply a less significant decline in Tobin’s q 
over time.  
Table VI shows that older firms incorporated in states that passed business combination statutes 
during the sample period experience the predicted less rapid decline in Tobin’s q ratios over time. 
Specifically, in column 1, we estimate our standard regression specification with the addition of BC, a 
binary variable equal to 1 if the firm is incorporated in a state that passed a business combination 
statute in a particular year, and equal to 0 otherwise. We also include an interaction term that combines 
listing age and BC. The numbers show that the coefficient of company age, ln(Age), remains negative 
and significant. Moreover, the existence of a business combination law per se contributes to a lower 
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Tobin’s q. However, the interaction of age and business combination statutes appears to slow down the 
decline of Tobin’s q over time. Hence, as predicted, business combination laws seem to protect firms 
and give their managers more time to tend to growth opportunities. We obtain similar results when 
measuring firm age with the binary variable Old dummy (column 2). Since Delaware is the state of 
incorporation of choice, it is possible that the results reflect a Delaware-specific effect. Columns 3 and 
4 therefore replicate the estimation while omitting firms incorporated in Delaware. The results, 
however, remain the same. Business combination laws delay the decay in Tobin’s q.  
 
C. Labor Market Competition 
Cross-sectional variation in the competitive structure of labor markets should have an effect on the 
relation between company age and growth opportunities as well. Non-compete clauses (NCC) in 
employment contracts limit the ability of employees to pursue own ventures or join firms in activities 
related to those of their employers. These clauses are not enforced uniformly across states in the U.S. 
Vigorous enforcement will help young firms because they prevent employees from leaving their 
employer to cash in on their knowledge and ideas. In contrast, they make it difficult for older firms to 
find creative employees. Hence, companies located in states that allow and enforce non-compete 
clauses in employment agreements should experience a quicker decline in Tobin’s q ratios over time. 
We test this prediction in Table VII. The proxy for the enforcement of noncompetition agreements 
is the noncompetition enforcement index from Garmaise (2011), which is based on data provided by 
Malsberger (2004). The index aggregates the answers to 12 questions about the enforcement of 
specific dimensions of noncompetition law in the state where the firm is headquartered. A high index 
value measures stricter enforcement. Regression 1 adds the non-competition index to our standard 
specification. Age maintains a negative and significant coefficient whereas the index is unrelated to 
Tobin’s q. In regression 2, we add an interaction term between the index and the binary measure of 
firm age. The interaction term has the predicted negative coefficient. Consequently, firms 
headquartered in states where NCCs are enforced more rigorously appear to run out of growth 
opportunities more quickly. The results are qualitatively the same when we use ln(Age) instead of the 
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binary age measure. In what follows, for reading convenience and to preserve space, we only report 
interaction terms with the binary age measure. 
 
V. Managerial Attention and Strategic Focus in Older Firms 
With our theory of managerial attention, as a firm gets older, it loses the ability to regenerate itself 
through the development of new growth opportunities. Management cannot expect that the firm will 
perform better because of exercising growth options. As a result, it has to focus more and more on the 
activities where it has its greatest comparative advantage. Therefore, we expect older firms to become 
more focused, to have less uncertainty, and to be more efficient in managing assets in place. Having 
paid less attention to the generation of growth opportunities early on, older firms should also 
increasingly lose the skills to generate such opportunities. Barring agency problems, older companies 
should therefore reduce their investment outlays, especially for R&D. We test these predictions in this 
section.  
  
A. Increased Focus 
Panel A of Table VIII reports coefficients from conditional logit regressions of the likelihood of 
asset sales against our usual control variables and firm age. In regression 1, the binary dependent 
variable identifies firms that engage in an asset sale (Asset sale dummy). In this regression, the 
coefficient of the binary measure of listing age, Old dummy, is positive and significant. As predicted, 
older firms are more likely to dispose of assets.  
Regression 2 identifies firms that sell core assets (Core asset sale dummy). A sale is core if the 
target and the acquiring company have the same 3-digit SIC codes. In contrast to that, regression 3 
focuses on sales of non-core assets (Non-core asset sale dummy), which occur when the target and the 
acquiring company have different 3-digit SIC codes. According to the results, the probability that 
older firms dispose of non-core assets is significantly higher than that of unwinding core assets. 
Hence, strategic focus does increase over time. Finally, regression 4 replicates regression 3 conditional 
on the subsample of firms that actually engage in asset sales. The results confirm that older firms are 
more likely to dispose of non-core assets.  
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Though a common view of diversification is that firms diversify to replace exhausted growth 
opportunities, Arikan and Stulz (2012) show that more mature firms are not more likely to make 
diversifying acquisitions than younger firms. If firms do not diversify more but sell more unrelated 
activities as they mature, we should find that the number of reported industrial segments fall as firms 
become older. We therefore estimate conditional logit regressions of the likelihood of a reduction in 
the number of reported segments with the same regression specification as that used in Panel A. 
According to the results, older firms are indeed significantly more likely to reduce the number of 
reported segments. An important caveat with this result is that firms can assign business units to 
segments strategically and that, during our sample period, there were changes in the rules that firms 
have to follow in assigning business units to segments.  
  
B. Decline in Uncertainty  
Table IX investigates the relation between firm age and investor uncertainty with OLS 
regressions with industry-year fixed-effects and firm-clustered standard errors. Investor uncertainty is 
approximated with asset volatility, namely a weighted average of equity and debt volatility (see 
Bharath and Shumway (2008)). The estimation shows that investor uncertainty does decline over time 
(see also Pastor and Veronesi (2003)), regardless of how we measure listing age. This finding is 
consistent with the hypothesis that firms focus and thereby reduce the perceived complexity of what 
they do.  
 
C. Increased Technical Efficiency 
We argue that firms focus to exploit their earnings potential, to make their products and services 
more attractive, and to lower costs. Table X tests whether the focusing effort pays off and allows older 
firms to become technically more efficient. We examine three different measures of technical 
efficiency, namely a sales/book-value-of-assets ratio, a sales/assets-in-place ratio, and the ratio of cost 
of goods sold (COGS) per number of employees. The analysis takes the usual form of OLS 
regressions with industry-year fixed effects and firm-clustered standard errors. The evidence is in line 
with the predicted increase in technical efficiency in older firms. Keeping everything else the same, 
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older firms generate significantly more sales per dollar of assets invested, regardless of whether we 
use a book measure of those assets or Richardson’s (2006) measure of assets in place. Companies also 
achieve significantly lower COGS per employee over time.  
 
D. Age and Current Profitability 
We would expect older firms to also experience better profitability, at least initially, as they 
improve their technical efficiency. Eventually, as a result of competition and the inability to innovate, 
profitability should decline. To investigate this prediction, we estimate nonparametric regressions 
similar to those shown for Tobin’s q in Figure 1. The results in Figure 3 reveal that ROA indeed 
increases initially until about year 12 after the IPO. Thereafter it falls relative to the industry average. 
In untabulated regressions, we find that the eventual decline in ROA is not compensated by bigger 
volume. Older firms grow more slowly and their market share actually shrinks over time. We also find 
that the sales growth of older firms is more likely to be negative than in other firms.  
The question is whether the profitability decline continues and ultimately turns into a financial 
loss, or whether it simply reflects the “strong presumption in economics that profitability is mean 
reverting” to the industry-wide level (see Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000)). Consistent with the 
latter prediction, we find that the probability that a firm will have a year with negative ROA falls with 
age (not tabulated).  
 
E. Age and Investment Policy 
We argued that, as firms aim at being the best in their current operations, they have less time to 
dedicate to developing activities outside their core business and their ability to innovate will fall. If so, 
they will be less likely to innovate. Hence, barring agency problems, we expect older firms to invest 
less to generate new growth opportunities. Their capital expenditures should be comparatively lower 
and they should engage less actively in R&D activities.  
Table XI investigates different measures of investment outlays and tests whether they grow with 
company age. We consider capital expenditures and R&D expenditures. These investment measures 
are standardized with sales and regressed on listing age and the usual set of control variables using 
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OLS with industry-year fixed-effects and firm-clustered standard errors. The coefficients on our age 
measure are all negative and significant regardless of whether we measure age with the natural 
logarithm of age or with the binary variable that identifies older firms.  
 
VI. Alternative Hypotheses 
As predicted by our managerial attention hypothesis, we find a negative relation between company 
age and growth opportunities. The relation is highly significant and quite robust with respect to 
different estimation techniques, regression specifications, and the way we measure firm age. In this 
section, we investigate three competing explanations of the negative relation between age and Tobin’s. 
According to these explanations examined in turn, the negative age relation between age and Tobin’s q 
could be the result of the relaxation of financial constraints over time, of increased managerial agency 
problems in older firms, and of firm management age. 
 
A. Aging and Financial Constraints 
Over time, investors learn more about firms and their business models and not surprisingly 
investor uncertainty declines. This loosens the financial constraints of firms over time and improves 
their access to capital markets. Consistent with these predictions, Hadlock and Pierce (2010) find that 
company age is a particularly useful predictor of financial constraints. Neoclassical theory predicts 
that firms with limited capital and a given set of investment opportunities undertake the most 
profitable investments first (Cooley and Quadrini (2001)). If so, it is not surprising to observe that 
older firms have lower Tobin’s q ratios—although the puzzling observation of their inability to 
regenerate their investment opportunity set remains. Table XII tests whether financial constraints are 
indeed responsible for at least part of the aging effect we uncover. 
To investigate, we use the payouts to shareholders as a proxy for financial constraints. We then 
test whether firms that are financially constrained experience a stronger decline of Tobin’s q over 
time—firms that are financially unconstrained are able to fund the investment opportunities they want, 
hence, in their case, their average Tobin’s q will be lower and less negatively declining (the 
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assumption is that q ratios converge monotonically to 1). Whereas Panel A focuses on dividend 
payouts, Panel B looks at total cash payouts (dividends plus share repurchases).  
In regression 1 of Panel A of Table XII, we expand the standard regression specification with a 
binary variable that distinguishes dividend payers from non-payers in any given year (Dividend 
dummy). In addition, we interact this variable with the binary measure of age (Old dummy). In this 
specification, firm age has, as before, a negative and significant coefficient. Neither the coefficient of 
Dividend dummy nor that of the interaction term is statistically significant at conventional levels of 
significance. Hence, there is no evidence that financial constraints are responsible for the age effect we 
find. We reach the same conclusion when we re-estimate the regression 1 but look back at listing age 5 
(Dividend 5 dummy) to distinguish between dividend payers and non-payers (regression 2). Under this 
specification, Dividend 5 dummy is negative and significant, indicating that financially unconstrained 
firms do indeed have lower qs. However, the variable Old dummy maintains a negative and significant 
coefficient and the interaction term remains statistically zero.  
To examine this latter result more closely, we split the sample by whether firms paid dividends at 
listing age 5 and estimate our regression equation for the two subsamples separately. This allows for 
different regression coefficients for all arguments. There is no difference, however, in the age 
coefficients in the two subsamples. We therefore conclude that financial constraints cannot be 
responsible for the decline in Tobin’s q ratios over time.  
Our conclusions do not change in Panel B, which repeats the analysis of Panel A, except for 
including share buybacks in the cash payouts to shareholders, as defined in Skinner (2008). The age 
coefficient remains negative and significant across all regression specifications. Moreover, the 
interaction term between financial constraints and company age has never a statistically significant 
coefficient. Note that financial constraints per se are related with Tobin’s q only when we look at the 
contemporaneous payouts (as opposed to those at age 5).  
 
B. Agency Problems in Older Firms 
The decrease in Tobin’s q with firm age could reflect agency problems between managers and 
firm owners that intensify as time goes by. Managers could have a preference for a quiet life and 
 25 
therefore decide to work less, steer away from risky investment and R&D projects, and simply milk 
the available lines of business. This quiet life hypothesis (Hicks (1935); Bertrand and Mullainathan 
(2003); Giroud and Mueller (2010)) could explain some of the observations we make, such as the 
decline in Tobin’s q, the decline in asset volatility, the reduction in investment and R&D activities, 
and the impact of competition. Yet it cannot explain why technical efficiency increases over time. A 
quiet life, however, is only one possible manifestation of managerial conflicts of interest. We therefore 
test whether older firms are more likely to have principal-agent problems, and whether that explains 
the impact of company age on Tobin’s q. Moreover, since older firms invest less, we want to see 
whether we find any evidence of cash redistribution or dissipation. We investigate whether the 
compensation of CEOs at older firms is higher and whether older firms return cash to shareholders. 
We also ask whether they end up accumulating larger cash balances. 
 
B.1. Age, Corporate Governance, and Tobin’s q 
Table XIII examines whether older firms are more prone to experience managerial agency 
problems. In Panel A, we therefore sort firms into old and young, and compare the values of various 
governance indices that have been suggested in the literature, namely the GIM index developed by 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), the delay index (Delay index) suggested by Kadyrzhanova and 
Rhodes-Kropf (2011), and the alternative takeover protection index (AT index) proposed by Cremers 
and Nair (2005). We also compare Board size and Executive ownership. According to this univariate 
analysis, older firms rank significantly higher on the indices of managerial entrenchment. They also 
have significantly larger boards and lower managerial stockholdings. Older firms could therefore be 
affected by more serious agency problems.  
In Panel B, we test whether these apparent problems could be responsible for the fewer growth 
opportunities generated by older firms. We therefore extend the standard regression of Tobin’s q with 
the proxies for management entrenchment. If the negative age coefficient is the consequence of agency 
problems, it should lose its statistical significance in this regression specification. The entrenchment 
variables are available only for relatively large and mature firms, as evidenced by the fact that the 
median listing age in this group of firms is 21, as opposed to 13 in the full sample. The binary measure 
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of company age is therefore redefined to denote firms older than 21 years of listing age. Moreover, 
since the sample of firms with the necessary data yields only 3,631 firm-years in 1,072 possible 
industry-year combinations, we drop industry-year fixed-effects from the regression specification and 
replace them with separate industry (138) and year (12) fixed-effects. For simplicity, we do not report 
the coefficients of the standard control variables and focus only on age and governance. Under the new 
specification, the age coefficient remains negative and significant, regardless of whether age is 
measured with the natural logarithm of the number of years since listing or with the new binary 
variable. This finding rejects the hypothesis that conflicts of interest are responsible for the decline of 
Tobin’s q ratios over time.  
Panel C provides an alternative test of the corporate governance hypothesis. Instead of including 
all the governance indices in the regression specification, we include them one at a time. We also 
include interaction terms of governance and company age. Even under this specification, however, the 
coefficient of company age remains generally negative and significant. The exception is in the case of 
the GIM index, in which neither company age nor governance index have significant coefficients. 
Note that no interaction term has a significant coefficient in any of the regressions. There is, 
consequently, no evidence that agency problems are responsible for the comparatively low growth 
opportunities in older firms.  
 
B.2. Age and CEO Compensation, Cash Payouts, and Cash Holdings 
We also find little evidence of greater wealth redistribution and wealth dissipation as firms age. 
Specifically, we use the model of Core, Guay, and Larcker (2008) to see whether CEO pay is higher in 
older firms (Panel A of Table XIV). The dependent variable in these regressions is the log of the 
CEO’s total compensation (ln(CEO total pay)). Regression 1 replicates the model of Core, Guay, and 
Larcker (2008). Regressions 2 and 3 add firm age as an additional control. Contrary to the prediction 
of wealth redistribution, however, CEO pay does not increase with the firm’s age. In fact, the opposite 
is true. CEOs make less money in older firms, possibly because they are less productive. Hence, if 
there are more serious agency problems in older firms, they manifest themselves in ways other than 
higher CEO pay. The fact that the CEOs of old firms make less money suggests that the negative age 
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effect on q could be driven by CEO talent. Yet, when we control for CEO compensation (the implied 
proxy for talent), the relation between age and q is still negative and significant.  
Since older firms seem to be unable to generate new growth opportunities, we want to know what 
they do with their excess cash. Poor governance would imply cash retention. We therefore test the null 
hypothesis of whether older firms are less likely to be dividend payers. The test is implemented as a 
conditional logit regression with industry-year fixed effects and robust standard errors. The results 
reject the null (not tabulated). In a second step, we use OLS regressions with industry-year fixed 
effects and firm-clustered standard errors to test whether older firms have lower payout ratios. The 
evidence in the first two columns of Panel B rejects that prediction as well. Older firms have actually 
higher payout ratios. Since dividends are not the only form of payout to shareholders, we also test 
whether older firms have comparatively lower total payout ratios, where total payouts are dividends 
plus share repurchases. The evidence rejects this prediction, too (columns 3 and 4 of the table). Older 
firms make higher payouts to shareholders. Finally, we inquire into whether older firms hold higher 
cash balances, yet the evidence shows that the opposite is true (columns 5 and 6 of the table).  
Overall, older firms do not give their CEOs a higher pay. If anything, they grant them a lower 
compensation. At the same time, they return cash to their shareholders and hold lower cash balances. 
There is therefore no evidence of wealth redistribution in the form of higher CEO compensation or of 
wealth dissipation.  
 
C. Company Age versus Management Age in Older Firms 
Company age could be a proxy for management age or tenure. Consistent with that possibility, 
Table XV shows that both CEO age and tenure are significantly higher in older firms. Directors are 
older and have longer tenure, too. The differences, however, are not very large. The directors of old 
firms, for example, are 64.5 years of age on average; in young firms, they are 61. The corresponding 
tenure numbers are 10.5 versus 8.3. A multivariate analysis in which we estimate our standard panel 
regression with CEO age as the dependent variable confirms that CEO age is positively correlated with 
company age even conditionally (not tabulated). However, management age or tenure cannot explain 
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the negative relation between company age and Tobin’s q. A look back at Panel B of Table XIII shows 
that adding CEO and director age and tenure does not erase that negative relation. 
  
VII. Conclusions 
This paper develops and tests a managerial attention theory which predicts that Tobin’s q falls 
with age and that factors that increase (decrease) management’s attention to assets in place as opposed 
to generating growth options accelerate (slow down) the fall of Tobin’s q with age. We predict that 
increased competition in the goods market forces management to devote more attention to generating 
growth options because the assets in place become less valuable. Using exogenous changes in 
competition brought about by tariff reductions, we find that increases in competition do reduce the 
negativity of the relation between Tobin’s q and firm age. In contrast, increased competition in the 
market for corporate control leads management to pay more attention to assets in place. As predicted, 
exogenous changes that decrease competition in the market for corporate control make the relation 
between Tobin’s q and age flatter. Finally, greater competition in the labor market makes it easier for 
firms to hire individuals who can help with generating growth opportunities. As a result, management 
devotes more attention to generating growth opportunities and the relation between Tobin’s q and age 
is flatter. This paper contributes to our understanding of how firms age, how they invest, how they are 
valued, and how they are affected by agency problems. 
It follows from the managerial attention theory that firms increasingly focus on their core activities 
over time and in the process invest less, are less active in R&D, and are more likely to divest assets. 
We find strong evidence supporting these predictions as well. Even though older firms might have 
more significant agency problems between shareholders and managers (they have larger boards and 
lower executive stock ownership), older firms return cash to shareholders and do not grant their CEOs 
compensation that is larger than usual. Moreover, there is no evidence that agency costs are 
responsible for the decay in growth opportunities over time. Finally, we find that our findings are not 
due to older firms having managers with longer tenure.  
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Appendix. Variable Definitions  
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Firm age 
Age Listing age, computed as one plus the difference between the year under 
investigation and the firm’s birth year. The birth year is computed as the minimum 
value of: (a) the first year the firm appears on the CRSP tapes; (b) the first year the 
firm appears on the COMPUSTAT tapes; and (c) the first year for which we find a 
link between the CRSP and the COMPUSTAT tapes;  
Ageinc We also compute age as the number of years (plus one) since incorporation. This 
information is from Jay Ritter’s Website as well as from Mergent Webreports; 
Ageinc at listing The firm’s incorporation age (Ageinc) at the time of listing; 
Old dummy Binary variable equal to 1 if the firm in question is older (in terms of listing age) 
than the sample median in any given year, and equal to 0 otherwise; 
  
Panel B: Profitability, productivity, and growth opportunities 
COGS/Employee The firm’s COGS (cogs) divided by the number of employees (emp); 
ROA Return on assets is the ratio of the firm’s operating income before depreciation 
(oibdp) divided by the lagged book value of total assets (at). The data are from 
COMPUSTAT; 
Sales/Assets The firm’s sales (sale) divided by the book value of assets at the beginning of the 
year (at); 
Sales/VAIP The firm’s sales (sale) divided by the value of the assets in place. VAIP is the value 
of the assets in place, as defined in Richardson (2006):  
 VAIP = (1-ar)BV+a(1+r)X-ard,  
Where BV is the book value of common equity (ceq), X is earnings (oiadp), d is 
dividends (dvc), r is the discount rate (12%), and a is w/(1+r-w). w is a fixed 
persistence parameter with a value of 0.62, as reported in Scharfstein and Stein 
(2000). 
Tobin’s q Tobin’s q, computed as the market value of the firm’s assets (Size) divided by their 
book value (at). The data are from COMPUSTAT; 
  
Panel C: Other firm-specific variables 
Asset sale dummy Binary variable that identifies firms that engage in an asset sale. The data is from 
SDC platinum; 
Asset volatility Asset volatility is the weighted average of equity volatility and debt volatility. Debt 
volatility is assumed be 5% + 0.25*Volatility. The weights are the ratio of book 
equity and book debt in the firm’s capital structure (defined as sum of book value of 
debt and equity). See Bharath and Shumway (2008); 
Analyst uncertainty The standard deviation of the 2-year EPS analyst forecasts, divided by the book 
value of equity (per share); 
BC dummy Binary variable equal to 1 if the firm is incorporated in a state that has passed a 
business combination law. 
Capex The ratio of capital expenses (capx) net of depreciation and amortization charges 
(dp) to sales (sale). The data are from COMPUSTAT; 
Cash holdings The firm’s cash balance (che) divided by the book value of assets; 
Core asset sale dummy Binary variable that identifies sales of core assets. Such a sale is assumed if the 
target and the acquiring company have the same 3-digit SIC codes; 
Dividend dummy Binary variable that identifies firms that pay dividends; 
Dividend 5 dummy Binary variable that identifies firms that paid dividends at age 5; 
Focus The Herfindahl index, HE, captures the degree of specialization based on the sales 
in the firm’s different segments, as reported on the COMPUSTAT Segment tapes:  
N 2
E ii 1
H p
=
= ∑ , 
where N is the number of segments, the subscript i identifies the segments, and pi is 
the fraction of the firm’s total sales in the segment in question; 
High competition dummy Binary variable that identifies firms in industries with low concentration (Sales-
weighted HH-index) < median industry concentration in any given year;  
KZ-index The Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index that measures a firm’s level of financial 
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constraints. We follow Lamont, Polk, and Saá-Requejo (2001, p. 552) and compute 
the KZ index as: –1.001909[(ib+dp)/ppentt-1] + 0.2826389[(Size)/at] + 
3.139193[(dltt+dlc)/(dltt+dlc+seq)] – 39.3678[(dvc+dvp)/ppentt-1] – 
1.314759[che/ att-1]. The data are from COMPUSTAT; 
Leverage Leverage is the firm’s long- and short-term debt (dltt+dlc) divided by the market 
value of assets (Size). The data are from COMPUSTAT; 
Lower tariff dummy A binary variable that identifies industry-years after a reduction in import tariffs. 
The data are from Frésard and Valta (2012). 
MTB-equity The market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the firm’s market value of equity 
(cshoprcc_f) divided by the book value of common equity (ceq). The data are 
from COMPUSTAT; 
Non-core asset sale 
dummy 
Binary variable that identifies sales of non-core assets. Such a sale is assumed if the 
target and the acquiring company have different 3-digit SIC codes; 
Noncompetition index The noncompetition enforcement index from Garmaise (2011), which is based on 
the data provided by Malsberger (2004). The index aggregates the answers to 12 
questions about the enforcement of specific dimensions of noncompetition law in 
the state where the firm is headquartered. The data start in 1992. 
Payout  The firm’s payout ratio is the ratio of total dividend payments (dvp+dvc) divided by 
the firm’s operating income before depreciation (oibdp). The data are from 
COMPUSTAT; 
Payout dummy Binary variable that identifies firms that pay dividends or repurchase shares. Share 
repurchases are defined as in Skinner (2008); 
Payout 5 dummy Binary variable that identifies firms with Payout dummy = 1 at age 5; 
Reduction in reported 
segments dummy 
Binary variable that identifies firms that reduce the number of reported segments on 
Compustat; 
sp500 dummy Binary variable that identifies S&P500 firms; 
R&D The firm’s R&D expenses (xrd) divided by its sales (sale). The data are from 
COMPUSTAT;  
Size Size, the log of market value of the assets at the beginning of the year, is 
approximated by the book value of assets (at) minus the book value of common 
equity (ceq) plus the market value of common equity (cshoprcc_f) minus deferred 
taxes (txtb). The data are from COMPUSTAT; 
Stock return The firm’s annual stock return, computed as (prcc_f+dvpsx)/l.prcc_f - 1. The data 
are from COMPUSTAT; 
Total payout The firm’s total payout to shareholders divided by operating income (oibdp). Total 
payout is the sum of dividend payment (dvp + dvc) as well as share repurchases, as 
defined in Skinner (2008); 
Volatility The volatility of the firm’s monthly stock return. We calculate the volatility over a 
five-year window and include all firm-years with at least 24 monthly returns. The 
data are from the monthly CRSP tapes;  
 
 
Panel D: Management team 
Board size The number of directors who serve on the firm’s board. The data are from IRRC; 
CEO age The age of the firm’s CEO, measured in years. The information is from 
ExecuComp; 
CEO tenure The tenure of the firm’s CEO, measured in years. The information is from 
ExecuComp; 
CEO total pay The CEO’s total compensation, expressed in thousands of 2009 USD. The data are 
from ExecuComp; 
Director age The average age of the firm’s directors, measured in years. The information is from 
Risk Metrics; 
Director tenure The average tenure of the firm’s directors, measured in years. The information is 
from Risk Metrics; 
Executive ownership The cumulative fraction of shares controlled by the firm’s officers. The data are 
from ExecuComp; 
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Panel E: Governance provisions 
Alternative takeover index The alternative takeover protection index, as suggested by Cremers and Nair (2005); 
Delay index An index of the four delay provisions in the GIM index (Kadyrzhanova and Rhodes-
Kropf (2011)); 
GIM index The firm’s score on the governance index from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). 
The index is provided on a bi- or triannual basis. To increase sample size, we 
interpolate the index for missing sample years. The data are from RiskMetrics. 
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Figure 1 
Firm Age and Tobin’s q 
The figure shows the relation between Tobin’s q ratios and company age implied by nonparametric regressions. 
The solid lines in the figures are obtained from local polynomial regressions of Tobin’s q ratios on firm age 
using an Epanechnikov kernel function with a “rule-of-thumb” bandwidth estimator and local-mean smoothing. 
The shaded area shows the 90% confidence interval. Figures (a) and (b) show the unconditional relation and 
measure age since listing and incorporation, respectively. To obtain Figures (c) and (d), we first estimate an OLS 
regression with industry-year fixed-effects of Tobin’s q on Capex, R&D, Focus, KZ-index, Leverage, Size, 
Volatility, and ROA. We then regress these residuals on listing and incorporation age, respectively. Listing age 
is restricted to between 1 and 30 years, incorporation age is restricted between 2 and 70 years. The sample period 
is 1978 – 2009.  
 
  
(a) Unconditional (Listing age; Full sample) (b) Unconditional (Incorporation age; Full sample) 
  
(c) Conditional (Listing age; Full sample) (d) Conditional (Incorporation age; Full sample) 
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Figure 2 
Probability of Regenerating Growth Opportunities in Early Years  
The following figure shows the fraction of firms with q > q*, sorted by age cohort. q* is the maximum ratio 
observed during the years 1 to 4 after listing. To adjust for common effects, the q ratios we use are the residuals 
from a pooled OLS regression of q on industry and year fixed-effects. The sample period is 1978 – 2009. 
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Figure 3 
Firm Age and ROA 
The figure shows the relation between ROA and company age implied by nonparametric regressions. The solid 
lines in the figures are obtained from local polynomial regressions of residual ROA on firm age using an 
Epanechnikov kernel function with a “rule-of-thumb” bandwidth estimator and local-mean smoothing. The 
shaded area shows the 90% confidence interval. Residual ROA is obtained from an OLS regression with 
industry-year fixed-effects of ROA on Capex, R&D, Focus, KZ-index, Leverage, Size, Volatility, and Market-to-
Book. The sample period is 1978 – 2009. 
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Table I 
Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. The summary statistics omit 
firms with listing age < 5, as most of the empirical investigation will also exclude these firms. The sample period 
is 1978 – 2009. 
 
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max Observations 
Age 
Listing age 17.45 13.00 13.91 5.00 85.00 83,790 
Incorporation age 34.44 25.00 26.01 5.00 193.00 69,982 
       
Growth opportunities and profitability 
Tobin’s q 1.785 1.301 1.455 0.559 9.599 83,790 
ROA 9.757 12.526 20.222 –83.277 53.554 83,102 
       
Productive efficiency 
Sales/Assets 1.422 1.251 0.981 0.033 5.462 83,205 
Sales/VAIP 2.626 2.029 5.717 –23.712 32.418 82,915 
COGS/Employee 189.4 120.8 228.3 13.1 1,531.8 81,709 
       
Asset sales 
Asset sale dummy 0.093 0.000 0.290 0.000 1.000 72,310 
Core asset sale dummy 0.039 0.000 0.193 0.000 1.000 72,310 
Non-core asset sale dummy 0.063 0.000 0.244 0.000 1.000 72,310 
       
Investments 
R&D/Sales 0.312 0.033 1.429 0.000 12.131 49,927 
Capex/Sales 0.027 0.003 0.166 –0.479 1.115 82,736 
       
Payout policy 
Dividend 0.055 0.000 1.624 –207.9 188.0 83,606 
Dividend dummy 0.412 0.000 0.492 0.000 1.000 83,606 
Total payout  0.014 0.000 31.510 –8,088.6 758.1 67,279 
Total payout dummy 0.561 1.000 0.496 0.000 1.000 67,375 
       
Agency costs 
CEO pay 4,574.6 2,493.7 5,957.0 268.6 36,468.4 15,473 
Cash holdings 0.153 0.074 0.187 0.000 0.840 83,787 
       
Additional control variables 
Focus 0.836 1.000 0.241 0.245 1.000 83,790 
KZ-Index –1.142 0.240 8.472 –58.455 20.455 82,558 
Leverage 0.192 0.147 0.184 0.000 0.727 83,532 
MTB-equity 2.475 1.627 3.736 –9.006 24.042 83,787 
Size  2,076.5 236.1 6,101.4 4.5 44,174.3 83,790 
Volatility 0.152 0.140 0.066 0.050 0.362 81,874 
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Table II 
Firm Age and Tobin’s q 
The table investigates the relation between company age and Tobin’s q. Panel A estimates OLS panel 
regressions with industry-year fixed-effects and firm-clustered standard errors. Regressions 1 and 2 relate to the 
full sample of firms. Regressions 3, 4, and 5 exclude firms with listing age younger than 5. Variable definitions 
are in the Appendix. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests with 
confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively. Panel B uses the estimates of the regressions 1 and 3 to compute 
the impact of company age on Tobin’s q. The sample period is 1978 – 2009.  
 
Panel A: OLS panel regressions  
 
 Dependent variable: Tobin’s q 
 Full sample Subsample with listing age >4 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ln(Age) –0.177***  –0.168***  –0.152*** 
 (0.014)  (0.018)  (0.021) Old dummy   –0.173***  –0.145***  
  (0.019)  (0.018)  ln(Ageinc at listing)     –0.080*** 
     (0.011) ROA –0.010*** –0.010*** –0.004*** –0.004*** –0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Capex 0.113*** 0.125*** 0.268*** 0.279*** 0.294*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.070) (0.070) (0.0081) R&D 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.136*** 0.136*** 0.126*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) 
Focus 0.432*** 0.499*** 0.376*** 0.414*** 0.354*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.044) KZ-index 0.001 0.002 –0.003 –0.003 –0.001*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) Leverage –2.787*** –2.799*** –2.379*** –2.383*** –2.454*** 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.056) (0.064) Size 0.187*** 0.177*** 0.173*** 0.165*** 0.183*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) Volatility 4.086*** 4.320*** 4.528*** 4.656*** 4.314*** 
 (0.205) (0.203) (0.212) (0.210) (0.244) Constant 0.854*** 0.484*** 0.698*** 0.312*** 0.838*** 
 (0.077) (0.069) (0.084) (0.067) (0.104) Industry-year FE Included Included Included Included Included 
      
Observations 87,437 87,437 68,611 68,611 55,893 
Adjusted R2 0.299 0.296 0.319 0.318 0.316 
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Panel B: The impact of company age 
 
 Age percentile 
 5th 25th Median 75th 95th 
Full sample 
Listing age 1 4 9 17 41 
Implied q 2.318 2.072 1.929 1.817 1.661 
      
      
Subsample with Listing age > 4 
Listing age 5 8 13 22 50 
Implied q 1.937 1.858 1.777 1.687 1.551 
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Table III 
Age and Tobin’s q: Industry-Specific Regressions 
We estimate separate regressions for each of the 48 industries identified by Fama and French (2001). We 
exclude industries, such as agriculture, with an insufficient number of observations. The regression specification 
is the same as that in column (3) of Table II, except we only have year-fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. The column labeled “marginal impact” computes the change in q if listing age goes 
from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the pooled age distribution in the industry. The impact is measured 
relative to the average q in the industry, and is shown only for statistically significant age coefficients. The 
symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, 
respectively. The sample period is 1978 – 2009. 
 
 Firm Age q  
 
years (Average) (Average) Coefficient of 
Ln(Age) 
Marginal Impact 
Food Products 1,118 19.5 1.54 0.021 — 
Candy & Soda 419 29.6 2.05 0.603*** 54.2% 
Beer & Liquor 173 18.2 1.19 0.039 — 
Recreation 1,033 17.7 1.45 –0.022 — 
Entertainment 2,035 15.0 1.62 –0.139*** –8.6% 
Printing and Publishing 336 15.4 1.63 –0.293*** –17.4% 
Consumer Goods 2,143 21.8 1.54 –0.157*** –9.7% 
Apparel 1,086 19.0 1.33 –0.186*** –13.1% 
Healthcare 1,722 12.6 1.84 –0.108 — 
Medical Equipment 3,514 15.4 2.65 –0.262*** –8.6% 
Pharmaceutical Products 3,767 13.0 3.62 0.107 — 
Chemicals 1,467 23.1 1.86 –0.191*** –11.6% 
Rubber and Plastic Products 881 17.6 1.39 –0.027 — 
Textiles 487 20.3 1.07 0.181*** 15.5% 
Construction Materials 1,737 21.5 1.26 –0.123*** –9.6% 
Construction 644 16.1 1.22 –0.019 — 
Steel Works Etc. 1,076 24.6 1.17 –0.027 — 
Fabricated Products 459 19.4 1.21 –0.206*** –15.5% 
Machinery 4,238 19.8 1.51 –0.160*** –10.8% 
Electrical Equipment 1,521 19.0 1.71 –0.168*** –10.0% 
Automobiles and Trucks 1,742 23.9 1.34 –0.083*** –7.0% 
Aircraft 614 26.6 1.39 –0.063 — 
Shipbuilding, Railroad Eq. 213 32.8 1.20 –0.108 — 
Defense 235 34.4 1.33 –0.085 — 
Precious Metals 386 14.9 2.21 0.062 — 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 3,649 14.8 1.60 –0.119*** –7.4% 
Communication 1,853 15.0 1.72 –0.117*** –6.4% 
Personal Services 893 16.0 1.70 –0.248** –13.4% 
Business Services 12,031 14.7 2.05 –0.212*** –9.8% 
Computers 4,603 13.6 2.06 –0.236*** –10.2% 
Electronic Equipment 6,388 16.1 1.87 –0.180*** –9.3% 
Measuring and Control Eq. 3,258 18.0 1.74 –0.307*** –16.5% 
Business Supplies 1,025 20.6 1.40 –0.093** –5.4% 
Shipping Containers 186 23.7 1.02 –0.092*** –10.6% 
Transportation 2,225 19.4 1.31 –0.209*** –15.7% 
Wholesale 5,174 19.1 1.33 –0.096*** –7.3% 
Retail 5,977 18.7 1.45 –0.162*** –10.5% 
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 2,212 17.2 1.45 –0.117*** –7.4% 
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Table IV 
Firms’ Ability to Return to the Initial Success 
This table investigates whether mature firms are able to replicate their initial growth opportunities. For the 8,079 
firms with sufficient data in our dataset, Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the maximum value of Tobin’s 
q before and after listing age 5, respectively. Panel B asks whether the firms’ probability of exceeding the 
maximum initial q measured during the first 4 years of listing age is a function of age. The dependent variable is 
a binary variable that identifies firms that switch from below the maximum initial q to above the maximum 
initial q. The subsample of firms we analyze are those with a Tobin’s q below the maximum initial q. We 
estimate conditional logit regressions with industry-year fixed-effects and robust standard errors. All control 
variables are lagged by one year. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance in two-sided tests with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively. The sample period is 
1978 – 2009. 
 
Panel A: Univariate analysis 
 
 Maximum Tobin’s q 
 Listing age 1 to 4 Listing age 5 and older 
mean 3.6 3.0 
p50 2.7 2.1 
min 0.5 0.6 
max 47.1 9.6 
sd 4.5 2.4 
N 8,079 8,079 
Mean comparison t-test 14.386*** 
 
Panel B: Switching probability from below to above the maximum initial q 
 
 Dependent variable: Dummy for firms that switch from  below to above the maximum initial q 
 (1) (2) (3) 
ln(Age) –0.308***   
 (0.048)   
Old dummy  –0.334*** –0.325*** 
  (0.045) (0.045) Old dummy × R&D   –0.052 
   (0.057) ROA 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Capex 0.074 0.074 0.077 
 (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) R&D 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.050*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) Focus –0.295*** –0.292*** –0.289*** 
 (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) 
KZ-index 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) Leverage –2.296*** –2.306*** –2.306*** 
 (0.147) (0.147) (0.147) Size 0.007 0.008 0.008 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) Volatility 3.801*** 3.873*** 3.887*** 
 (0.436) (0.433) (0.432) Industry-year FE Included Included Included 
    
Observations 26'475 26'475 26'475 
Adjusted R2 0.033 0.034 0.034 
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Table V 
Firm Aging and Product Market Competition 
The table investigates how the relation between company age and Tobin’s q is affected by industry competition. 
We use concentration data from Hoberg and Phillips (2011) and, alternatively, industry-specific reductions in 
import tariffs from Frésard and Valta (2012). High competition dummy means concentration below the sample 
median concentration in any given year. Lower tariff dummy identifies industry-years after a reduction in import 
tariffs. Industries with no significant changes in import tariffs are omitted from regressions 3 and 4. The sample 
excludes firms younger than 5 in terms of listing age. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. The symbols ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively. 
The sample period is 1986 – 2008 in regressions 1 and 2 and 1978 – 2009 in regressions 3 and 4.  
 
 Tobin’s q Standardized q Tobin’s q Standardized q 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln(Age) –0.160*** –0.140*** –0.328*** –0.323*** 
 (0.034) (0.021) (0.054) (0.042) High competition dummy (lagged) –0.280** –0.265***   
 (0.116) (0.072)   
ln(Age)×High competition dummy (lagged) 0.068* 0.047*   
 (0.038) (0.024)   
Lower tariff dummy   –0.710*** –1.014*** 
   (0.178) (0.133) ln(Age)×Lower tariff dummy   0.254*** 0.256*** 
   (0.060) (0.044) Average q  –0.140***  –0.095*** 
  (0.020)  (0.024) 
ROA –0.006*** –0.005*** –0.009*** –0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) Capex 0.314*** 0.137*** 0.337 0.352** 
 (0.100) (0.049) (0.229) (0.166) R&D 0.101*** 0.106*** 0.121*** 0.108*** 
 (0.022) (0.013) (0.027) (0.018) 
Focus 0.490*** 0.341*** 0.347*** 0.263*** 
 (0.062) (0.037) (0.082) (0.056) KZ-index –0.006*** –0.004*** 0.001 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) Leverage –2.682*** –1.780*** –3.036*** –2.200*** 
 (0.083) (0.049) (0.127) (0.094) Size 0.202*** 0.115*** 0.234*** 0.142*** 
 (0.010) (0.006) (0.014) (0.009) Volatility 3.298*** 1.581*** 5.489*** 2.966*** 
 (0.302) (0.152) (0.478) (0.292) Constant 0.746*** –0.244** 0.941*** 0.268* 
 (0.150) (0.101) (0.212) (0.157) Industry-year fixed-effects Included Excluded Included Excluded 
     
Number of observations 27'423 27'423 16'586 16'586 
Adjusted R2 0.298 0.229 0.340 0.249 
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Table VI 
Firm Aging and Competition in the Market for Corporate Control 
The table investigates how the existence of business combination laws in the state of incorporation affects the 
relation between listing age and Tobin’s q. The states passed these laws during the sample period. Regressions 1 
to 4 are estimated for the full sample of firms with listing age > 4. Regressions 5 and 6 exclude firms 
incorporated in Delaware. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance in two-sided tests with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively. The sample period is 
1978 – 2009. 
 
 Dependent variable: Tobin’s q 
 Full Sample Sample w/o Delaware companies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln(Age) –0.333***  –0.360***  
 (0.025)  (0.039)  Old dummy  –0.283***  –0.244*** 
  (0.028)  (0.038) BC dummy –0.607*** –0.135*** –0.518*** –0.094 
 (0.093) (0.043) (0.148) (0.062) ln(Age) × BC dummy 0.209***  0.178***  
 (0.029)  (0.046)  
Old dummy × BC dummy  0.184***  0.109** 
  (0.036)  (0.055) ROA –0.004*** –0.004*** 0.003 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Capex 0.346*** 0.360*** 0.334* 0.354** 
 (0.083) (0.083) (0.178) (0.177) 
R&D 0.124*** 0.125*** 0.215*** 0.219*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.050) (0.051) 
Focus 0.378*** 0.417*** 0.332*** 0.388*** 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.068) (0.069) 
KZ-index –0.004* –0.004* –0.004 –0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Leverage –2.461*** –2.462*** –2.150*** –2.162*** 
 (0.064) (0.065) (0.107) (0.108) 
Size 0.175*** 0.165*** 0.184*** 0.169*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) 
Volatility 4.488*** 4.606*** 4.932*** 5.149*** 
 (0.239) (0.238) (0.400) (0.395) 
Constant 1.201*** 0.446*** 1.029*** 0.168 
 (0.103) (0.081) (0.158) (0.122) 
Industry-year FE Included Included Included Included 
     
Number of observations 56,332 56,332 21,632 21,632 
Adjusted R2 0.316 0.314 0.305 0.300 
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Table VII 
Firm Aging and Labor Market Competition 
The table investigates the impact of state employment laws on the relation between company age and Tobin’s q. 
The proxy for the enforcement of noncompetition agreements at the state level is the noncompetition 
enforcement index from Garmaise (2011), which is based on the data provided by Malsberger (2004). The index 
aggregates the answers to 12 questions about the enforcement of specific dimensions of noncompetition law in 
the state where the firm is headquartered. The data start in 1992. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. The 
symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, 
respectively. The sample period is 1992 – 2009. 
 
 Dependent variable: Tobin’s q 
Old dummy –0.114*** 0.034 
 (0.026) (0.052) Noncompetition index 0.003 0.021** 
 (0.007) (0.009) 
Old dummy × Noncompetition index  –0.039*** 
  (0.011) ROA –0.006*** –0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) Capex 0.339*** 0.340*** 
 (0.093) (0.093) R&D 0.108*** 0.108*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) Focus 0.495*** 0.496*** 
 (0.053) (0.053) KZ-index –0.004** –0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Leverage –2.800*** –2.807*** 
 (0.074) (0.075) 
Size 0.192*** 0.193*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) Volatility 4.266*** 4.261*** 
 (0.260) (0.260) Constant 0.265*** 0.195** 
 (0.096) (0.099) Industry-year FE Included Included 
   
Number of observations 39,814 39,814 
Adjusted R2 0.297 0.298 
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Table VIII 
Firm Age and the Focus on the Core 
The table investigates whether firms are more likely to focus on core activities as they get older. It reports 
coefficients are from conditional logit regressions with industry-year fixed-effects and clustered standard errors. 
Panel A looks at the likelihood of asset sales. Asset sale data are from SDC Platinum. In regression 1, the 
dependent variable is a binary variable that identifies firms that engage in an asset sale (Asset sale dummy). 
Regression 2 identifies firms that sell core assets (Core asset sale dummy). Such a sale is assumed if the target 
and the acquiring company have the same 3-digit SIC codes. Regression 3 focuses on sales of non-core assets 
(Non-core asset sale dummy). Such a sale is assumed if the target and the acquiring company have different 3-
digit SIC codes. Finally, regression 4 replicates regression 3 for the subsample of firms that actually engage in 
asset sales (Asset sale dummy = 1). Panel B investigates whether old firms are more likely to reduce the number 
of reported segments on Compustat. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. The symbols ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively. The sample 
period is 1978 – 2009. 
 
Panel A: Firm age and asset sales 
 
 Asset Sale Dummy 
Core Asset Sale 
Dummy 
Non-core Asset 
Sale Dummy 
Non-core Asset Sale Dummy 
conditional on Asset Sale Dummy = 1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Old dummy 0.318*** 0.113** 0.435*** 0.318*** 
 (0.038) (0.050) (0.049) (0.071) ROA –0.012*** –0.010*** –0.014*** –0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) Capex –0.208 0.294 –0.958*** –1.161*** 
 (0.207) (0.266) (0.220) (0.253) 
R&D –0.108*** –0.117*** –0.113** 0.012 
 (0.040) (0.033) (0.050) (0.052) Focus –1.550*** –0.472*** –2.022*** –1.795*** 
 (0.078) (0.098) (0.082) (0.119) KZ-index 0.002 0.001 0.000 –0.007 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) Leverage 1.042*** 1.104*** 0.940*** –0.030 
 (0.096) (0.122) (0.104) (0.173) Size 0.416*** 0.405*** 0.434*** 0.078*** 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.023) Volatility –0.437 1.291*** –1.556*** –3.046*** 
 (0.272) (0.375) (0.335) (0.616) MTB-equity –0.007 0.001 –0.010 –0.013 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) 
Year FE Included Included Included Included 
N 60,515 60,515 60,515 5,783 
Pseudo R2 0.153 0.084 0.189 0.085 
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Panel B: Reduction in the number of segments reported on Compustat 
 Reduction in reported segments dummy 
ln(Age) 0.454***  
 (0.041)  Old dummy  0.410*** 
  (0.046) ROA –0.010*** –0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Tobin’s q –0.056*** –0.068*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) 
Capex –0.373* –0.413* 
 (0.219) (0.218) R&D –0.433** –0.460** 
 (0.188) (0.205) KZ-index 0.007** 0.006** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Leverage 1.152*** 1.147*** 
 (0.133) (0.133) Size 0.114*** 0.149*** 
 (0.014) (0.013) Volatility 2.372*** 1.991*** 
 (0.501) (0.505) Industry-year FE Included Included 
N 35,371 35,371 
Adjusted R2 0.038 0.034 
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Table IX 
Firm Age and Uncertainty about Business Models 
The table asks whether investors’ uncertainty declines as firms get older. We study the relation between firm age 
and asset volatility with OLS regressions with industry-year fixed-effects and firm-clustered standard errors. 
Variable definitions are in the Appendix. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance in two-
sided tests with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively. The sample period is 1978 – 2009. 
 
 
 Dependent variable: Asset volatility 
ln(Age) –0.048***  
 (0.005)  Old dummy  –0.049*** 
  (0.006) ROA –0.002*** –0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) Analyst uncertainty 0.224*** 0.225*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) Capex –0.014 –0.011 
 (0.017) (0.018) R&D 0.003 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Focus 0.030*** 0.046*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) KZ-index 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) Size –0.034*** –0.038*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) MTB-equity 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) Constant 0.774*** 0.680*** 
 (0.020) (0.019) Industry-year FE Included Included 
Observations 13,513 13,513 
Adjusted R2 0.602 0.597 
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 Table X 
Firm Age and Technical Efficiency 
The table studies the relation between firm age and technical efficiency. We estimate OLS regressions with 
industry-year fixed effects and firm-clustered standard errors. In regression 1, the dependent variable is 
Sales/Asset. Regression 2 standardizes sales with the value of the assets in place (VAIP) instead of book assets.  
Following Richardson (2006), VAIP is: VAIP = (1-ar)BV+a(1+r)X-ard. BV is the book value of common equity 
(ceq), X is earnings (oiadp), d is dividends (dvc), r is the discount rate (12%), and a is w/(1+r-w). w is a fixed 
persistence parameter with a value of 0.62, as reported in Scharfstein and Stein (2000). Finally, regression 3 
looks at the firm’s COGS per employee (COGS/Employee). Variable definitions are in the Appendix. The 
symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, 
respectively. The sample period is 1978 – 2009. 
 
 Sales/Assets Sales/ VAIP COGS/Employee  (1) (2) (3) 
ln(Age) 0.047*** 0.172*** –13.128*** 
 (0.012) (0.057) (3.255) Capex –0.116*** –0.366*** –48.720*** 
 (0.023) (0.118) (11.174) R&D –0.018*** –0.062*** 17.013*** 
 (0.004) (0.017) (1.985) Focus 0.008 –0.093 30.323*** 
 (0.029) (0.132) (7.091) 
KZ-index –0.001 0.011*** –1.629*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.296) Leverage –0.370*** 3.140*** 26.806*** 
 (0.037) (0.230) (10.202) MTB-equity 0.010*** 0.052*** –1.332*** 
 (0.001) (0.011) (0.345) Size –0.095*** –0.229*** 11.488*** 
 (0.005) (0.019) (1.182) Volatility 0.993*** –1.691** 166.406*** 
 (0.133) (0.704) (35.474) ROA 0.016*** 0.020*** –0.465*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.092) 
Constant 1.563*** 2.923*** 107.112*** 
 (0.058) (0.282) (15.001) Industry-year FE Included Included Included 
    
Number of observations 68,609 67,861 67,138 
Adjusted/Pseudo R2 0.530 0.082 0.359 
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Table XI 
Firm Age and Investment Activities 
The table studies firms’ investment policy. It shows the results of OLS regressions with industry-year fixed-
effects and firm-clustered standard errors. We consider capital expenses (regressions 1 and 2) and R&D 
expenses (regressions 3 and 4). All investment measures are standardized with sales. Variable definitions are in 
the Appendix. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests with confidence 
0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively. The sample period is 1978 – 2009. 
 
 Capex R&D  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln(Age) –0.011***  –0.067***  
 (0.002)  (0.011)  Old dummy  –0.009***  –0.087*** 
  (0.002)  (0.013) Capex   0.014 0.015 
   (0.125) (0.125) R&D 0.000 0.000   
 (0.003) (0.003)   Focus 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.121*** 0.126*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.022) (0.021) KZ-index 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.003** 0.003** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) Leverage –0.003 –0.003 –0.413*** –0.413*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.037) (0.037) 
Size 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.045*** 0.043*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) Volatility –0.083*** –0.074*** 0.214 0.213 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.150) (0.149) ROA 0.000** 0.000** –0.020*** –0.020*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) MTB-equity 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) Constant 0.026*** 0.000 0.225*** 0.095** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.051) (0.041) Ind-year FE Included Included Included Included 
     
N 68,609 68,609 68,609 68,609 
Adjusted R2 0.184 0.183 0.293 0.294 
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Table XII 
Firm Age and Credit Constraints 
The table asks whether the negative relation between firm age and Tobin’s q is the result of looser credit 
constraints in older firms. We test whether the age effect is different for dividend payers and non-payers. Panel 
A looks at actual dividend payments, Panel B studies total payouts (dividends plus share repurchases). In each 
panel, the first row shows the coefficients from our standard regression when we add a binary variable for 
contemporaneous payouts. In the second regression, we measure financial constraints at the time firms enter our 
sample. Therefore, the binary variable equals 1 if the firm paid dividends (repurchased shares) at age 5. 
Otherwise, the variable is equal to 0. Finally, the third and fourth regressions in both panels split the sample into 
payers and non-payers at age 5. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance in two-sided tests with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively. The sample period is 
1978 – 2009. 
 
Panel A: Dividend payments 
 
 Dependent variable: Tobin’s q 
 Full sample No dividends at age 5 
Dividends 
at age 5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Old dummy –0.123*** –0.113*** –0.092*** –0.068*** 
 (0.024) (0.027) (0.029) (0.020) 
Dividend dummy –0.028    
 (0.026)    
Old dummy × Dividend dummy –0.045    
 (0.031)    
Dividend 5 dummy  –0.102***   
  (0.027)   
Old dummy × Dividend 5 dummy  –0.018   
  (0.034)   
     
Additional controls Included Included Included Included 
Industry-year FE Included Included Included Included 
     
Number of observations 68'609 55'788 35'833 19'955 
Adjusted R2 0.318 0.317 0.293 0.485 
 
 
Panel B: Total payout 
 
 Dependent variable: Tobin’s q 
 Full sample No payouts at age 5 
Payouts 
at age 5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Old dummy -0.110*** -0.095*** -0.076** -0.082** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.037) (0.034) 
Payout dummy -0.120***    
 (0.026)    
Old dummy × Payout dummy -0.036    
 (0.036)    
Payout 5 dummy  -0.046   
  (0.033)   
Old dummy × Payout 5 dummy  -0.009   
  (0.044)   
     
Additional controls Included Included Included Included 
Industry-year FE Included Included Included Included 
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Number of observations 48,110 32,765 21,546 11,219 
Adjusted R2 0.302 0.282 0.281 0.244 
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Table XIII 
Company Age and Managerial Entrenchment 
The table tests whether the existence of managerial agency problems in older firms can explain the aging effect 
documented above. The proxies for management entrenchment we consider are Board size, Executive ownership, 
the GIM index (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003), the delay index (Delay index) suggested by Kadyrzhanova 
and Rhodes-Kropf (2011), as well as the alternative takeover protection index (AT index) suggested by Cremers 
and Nair (2005). Panel A shows mean comparison tests between old and young firms. Panel B extends the 
standard regression from Table II with the proxies for management entrenchment. To preserve space, we report 
only a subset of the regression coefficients. Since entrenchment index data are available mostly for large and 
mature firms, the median listing age for that subsample of firms is 21 (compared to 13 in the full sample). 
Therefore, the new binary age variable is defined as follows: Age >21 dummy = 1 if listing age > 21, otherwise 
Age >21 dummy = 0. Moreover, since the number of firm years in that subsample is 3,631 firm-years spread 
across 1,072 industry-year combinations, we use separate industry and year fixed effects, as opposed to industry-
year fixed effects. Panel C performs similar regressions with the addition of interaction terms of corporate 
governance indices and company age. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. The symbols ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively. The sample 
period is 1996 – 2009. 
 
Panel A: Mean comparison tests 
 
 Age >21 dummy = 0 Age >21 dummy = 1 t-Test Board size 7.701 9.313 31.262*** 
Executive ownership 0.054 0.036 –14.452*** 
GIM index 7.889 9.352 30.876*** 
Delay index 5.651 7.343 39.789*** 
Alternative takeover index 2.053 1.954 6.354*** 
 
Panel B: Firm age and the impact of governance  
 
 Dependent variable: Tobin’s q 
ln(Age) –0.104**  
 (0.051)  Age > 21 dummy  –0.171*** 
  (0.061) Analyst uncertainty 1.946*** 1.971*** 
 (0.454) (0.453) GIM-index 0.008 0.009 
 (0.012) (0.012) 
Boardsize –0.068*** –0.067*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Executive stock ownership 0.371 0.350 
 (0.561) (0.555) CEO age –0.001 –0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) CEO tenure 0.000 –0.000 
 (0.004) (0.004) Director age –0.010 –0.009 
 (0.008) (0.008) Director tenure 0.017** 0.016** 
 (0.008) (0.008)    
Other controls Included Included 
Industry FE Included Included 
Year FE Included Included 
   Number of observations 3,631 3,631 
Adjusted R2 0.601 0.602 
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Panel C: Interaction of firm age and governance indices 
 
 Dependent variable: Tobin’s q 
Age >21 dummy –0.216*** –0.107 –0.216*** –0.313** –0.214*** –0.399** 
 (0.064) (0.231) (0.060) (0.123) (0.059) (0.159) GIM index 0.001 0.007     
 (0.012) (0.020)     
Age >21 dummy × GIM index  –0.012     
  (0.024)     
Delay index   –0.020 –0.041   
   (0.023) (0.036)   
Age >21 dummy × Delay index    0.042   
    (0.044)   
AT index     –0.030 –0.073 
     (0.035) (0.057) 
Age >21 dummy × AT index      0.088 
      (0.068)        
Other controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry-year FE Included Included Included Included Included Included 
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Table XIV 
Firm Age, CEO pay, Cash Payouts, and Cash Holdings 
The table asks whether old firms engage in excessive CEO compensation and whether they are more likely to 
return their cash to shareholders. In Panel A, we use the Model of Core, Guay, and Larcker (2008) to see 
whether CEO pay is related to firm age. We estimate OLS regressions with industry-year fixed effects and firm-
clustered standard errors. The dependent variable is the log of the CEO’s total compensation (ln(CEO total 
pay)). Regression 1 replicates the model of Core, Guay, and Larcker (2008). Regressions 2 and 3 add the two 
measures of firm age as additional controls. Panel B examines payout policies and cash holdings. In regressions 
1 and 2, the dependent variable is the firm’s dividend payout ratio (Payout). Regressions 3 and 4 look at total 
payout (dividends plus share repurchases). Regressions 5 and 6 study cash holdings. All regressions are OLS 
with industry-year fixed effects and firm-clustered standard errors. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. The 
symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance in two-sided tests with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, 
respectively. The sample period is 1978 – 2009. 
 
Panel A: Firm age and CEO pay 
 
 ln(CEO total pay)  (1) (2) (3) 
ln(Age)  –0.026*  
  (0.014)  Old dummy   –0.058*** 
   (0.018) 
ln(CEO tenure) –0.031*** –0.031*** –0.030*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) sp500 dummy 0.126*** 0.132*** 0.133*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) Tobin’s qt-1 0.056*** 0.055*** 0.054*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) Stock return 0.134*** 0.134*** 0.133*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) Stock returnt-1 0.116*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) ROA 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ROAt-1 –0.006*** –0.006*** –0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) ln(CEO total pay)t-1 0.486*** 0.485*** 0.484*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) ln(Sales)t-1 0.206*** 0.210*** 0.211*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) Constant 2.512*** 2.563*** 2.529*** 
 (0.104) (0.106) (0.103) Industry-year FE Included Included Included 
    
Number of observations 11'786 11'786 11'786 
Adjusted R2 0.570 0.570 0.570 
 
 
  
 56 
Panel B: Firm age and cash payouts 
 
 Payout Total Payout Cash Holdings 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln(Age) 0.019***  0.017***  –0.022***  
 (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.002)  
Old dummy  0.014***  0.013***  –0.018*** 
  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.002) ROA –0.000 –0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Capex –0.026*** –0.027*** –0.049*** –0.050*** 0.014** 0.016** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) 
R&D 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002* 0.002 0.028*** 0.028*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) Focus –0.018*** –0.023*** –0.021** –0.025*** 0.055*** 0.060*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) KZ-index –0.005*** –0.005*** –0.005*** –0.005*** –0.003*** –0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) Leverage –0.022*** –0.022*** –0.065*** –0.065*** –0.317*** –0.317*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) Size 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.001 –0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Volatility –0.412*** –0.431*** –0.792*** –0.808*** 0.194*** 0.213*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.045) (0.044) (0.027) (0.027) MTB-equity 0.000 0.000 0.001** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.056*** 0.102*** 0.137*** 0.178*** 0.190*** 0.137*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.019) (0.016) (0.011) (0.010) 
Industry-year FE Included Included Included Included Included Included 
       
Observations 68'607 68'607 55'673 55'673 68'609 68'609 
Adj./Pseudo R2 0.247 0.244 0.100 0.099 0.434 0.432 
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Table XV 
Company Age and Management Age 
The table investigates the relation between company age and the age of management and directors. The measures 
of management and director age are CEO age, CEO tenure, Director age, and Director tenure, respectively. 
Variable definitions are in the Appendix. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance in two-
sided tests with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively. The sample period is 1978 – 2009. 
 
 Old dummy = 0 Old dummy = 1 t-Test CEO age 61.136 64.516 22.244*** 
CEO tenure 8.391 8.738 2.620*** 
Director age 57.794 60.219 27.402*** 
Director tenure 8.262 10.541 26.182*** 
 
 
